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ARGUMENT
I.
HOWELLS, INC. V. NELSON DOES NOT CONTROL.
McShane relied in the lower court and relies in this
Court on Howellsy Inc. v. Nelsonf 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah,
1977) as controlling.

Howells was decided prior to the

enactment of the current Utah Bad Check Statute.

The old

law was repealed and the current law enacted in 1981.

A

copy of the repealed statute is contained in the Addendum
to this Brief.

The statute which Howells interpreted was

a fraud statute.

That statute invoked liability upon "any

person who willfully, with intent to defraud, makes ...
any check ... ."

Howells turned upon the absence of

required elements of fraud.

The court determined,

... the Plaintiff was not induced to give
anything of value, nor was it in any way cheated
or adversely effected by the giving of the
check. Id^ at 1149.
Inducement is an element of Common Law Fraud in Utah.

See

Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141 247 P.2d 273 (1952).
The court further held that because the plaintiff in
Howells had specifically agreed to take a post-dated
check, the instrument did not come within the definition
of a check.

It was therefore not covered by the then

existing fraudulent check statute.
-2-
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In ] 979, the section was amended. T;,e new
section removed the issue of fraud, and pl;:.^;3
absolute liability on the issuer of a dish ^ored
check as well as the signing agent: \ 66.
(emphasis added)
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Check Statute in light of provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code which would otherwise control (Utah Code
Annotated 70A-3-403 (1953, as amended 1965)).

It

concludes that the Utah Bad Check Statute should be
amended.

It does not conclude that this amendment should

be by judicial fiat.

If the Statute is to be amended/ the

appropriate method of amendment would be by the
Legislature/ who created it in the first place.
The clear public policy behind the current Utah Bad
Check Statute is to transfer the burden for bad corporate
checks from the holder of the check to the person who
issued the check/ regardless of his status as a corporate
officer or otherwise.

Had the Legislature wished to allow

the defenses available under the previous Utah Bad Check
Statute or under the Uniform Commercial Codef it could
easily have done so.

The Legislature obviously did not

wish to allow these defenses because of the broad scope of
documents which are made subject to the Statute/ and
because of the simple manner in which liability is
invoked.
The Utah Bad Check Statute is a strict liability
statute which was drafted by the Legislature for an
obvious business purpose/ and which should not be amended/
nor defeated/ by this Court.
-4-

II.
APPELLANT MAY NOT RAISE HIS CLAIM OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY FOR THE FIRST TIME
ON APPEAL.
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Even \ f the Utah Bad

Check Statute were unconstitutional/ arguendo/ he may not
raise that issue at this late date.
III.
THE UTAH BAD CHECK STATUTE IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Without waiving his primary defense to McShane's
constitutionality argument shown in the preceeding
section/ Haig specifically shows that the Utah Bad Check
Statute is not unconstitutional.
Article 1 Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
provides/
No person shall be deprived of lifef liberty or
property/ without due process of law.
The operative language of this Section of the Utah
Constitution is identical to the operative language of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States.

Cases interpreting the Fourteenth

Amendment should therefore be instructive of this
language.
In Parratt v. Taylor/ 451 U.S. 527f 68 L.Ed. 2d 420f
101 S.Ct. 1908 (1981)/ the Supreme Court discussed the due
process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nothing in that Amendment protects against all
deprivations of lifef liberty or property by the
State. The Fourteenth Amendment protects only
against deprivations "without due process of
law." Id. at 68 L.Ed. 2d 430.

-6-

In Parratt, the Supreme Court reviewed many of its due
process decisions for the twenty-one years preceding the
decision.
In some cases, this Court has held that due
process requires a pre-deprivation hearing
before the State interferes with any liberty or
property interest enjoyed by its citizens. In
most of these cases, however, the deprivation of
property was pursuant to some established State
procedure and "process" could be offered before
any actual deprivation took place. Id.
The gravamen of all of these cases was that a hearing was
required.
In all these cases, deprivations of property
were authorized by an established State
procedure and due process was held to require
predeprivation notice and hearing in order to
serve as a check on the possibility that a
wrongful deprivation would occur. Id.
All that is required is a hearing.

Article 1 Section 7 of

the Utah Constitution was previously so interpreted; see
Jensen v. Union Pacific Railway Company, 6 Utah 253, 21
Pacific 994 (1889).

McShane had his hearing at the time

the court awarded summary judgment.
McShane confuses due process with a supposed right to
present defenses which the Statute has removed.
had his day in court.

McShane

He had the opportunity to establish

any defenses which remain, following the Legislature's
implementation of strict liability in this matter.

He

could have presented numerous defenses which would have
-7-

not been removed by the new Statute, had those defenses
been factually available to him.

Had he alleged and shown

by affidavit that he did not sign the check or that he
signed the check under duress, those defenses would
certainly have avoided summary judgment.
were factually available.

No such defenses

The Legislature's removal of

defenses which existed prior to the repealing of the
former Statute does not rise to level of
unconstitutionality.
IV.
THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
WAS NOT OPPOSED BY A PROPER AFFIDAVIT.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires,
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
McShane refers, both in his Brief in this Court and in his
Memorandum in the lower court, to a conversation
supposedly had between Haig and the Third-Party Defendant,
Ronald Davey, whereby Haig acknowledged that there was no
money in the account or that the check would be held for
an unspecified period of time before being negotiated.
The record is notably devoid of any affidavit from any
person testifying to this alleged conversation.
-8-

Rule

56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this Rule, an adverse
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
Rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.
Even if the alleged conversation between Haig and Davey
had taken place and was material, McShane's failure to
properly present it through affidavits in the lower court
makes the summary judgment in the lower court well-taken.
Parenthetically, Haig notes that such an affidavit
should not have avoided summary judgment because of the
arguments made in section one of this Brief.
V.
HAIG IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE LOWER
COURT, AS WELL AS ON APPEAL.
The lower court granted summary judgment on Haig's
Bad Check claim, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 7-15-1
(1953, as amended 1981).

Utah Code Annotated 7-15-1(3)

(1953, as amended 1981) provides for the payment of
attorney's fees by persons in McShane's position.

Fees

were properly awarded below.
Similarly, because of the statute authorizing
attorney's fees to Haig, he is entitled to recover those
attorney's fees reasonably expended in defending this
appeal; see Christensen v. Abbott, 671 P.2d 121 (Utah,
-9-

1983).
CONCLUSION
The decision of the lower court was legally correct,
and the appeal should be dismissed.
DATED this

| ItiP^ day of October, 1986.
Respectfully submitted,
COOK & WILDE, P.C.

ROBERT W WILDE
Attorney for Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

of October,

1986f four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF were deposited in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
DONN E. CASSITY
ROMNEYf NELSON & CASSITY
Atttorneys for Appellant
136 East South Temple, #900
University Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM!

FRAUDULENT CHECKS

7-15-1

7-14-3. Immunity from liability.—Any commercial, national, or state
bank making any report or communication of information authorized by
this act sliall not be liable to any person for disclosing such information to
any recipient authorized under the provisions of this act, or for any error
or omission in such report or communication.
History: L. 1967, ch. 15, § 3 .

7-14-4. Reciprocal exchange of information authorized.—One or more
commercial, national, or state banks may jointly agree with one or more
other banks or other financial institutions for the reciprocal exchange of
any information authorized to be reported by the provisions of this act.
Such reciprocal exchange of information or the acts or refusals to act of
one or more recipients because of such information shall not constitute
a boycott or blacklist, or otherwise be a basis for liability to any person
on the part of any participant in the reciprocal exchange of information
authorized by this act.
History: L. 1967, ch. 15, § 4 .

7-14-5. "Financial institution" and "credit reporting agency" defined.—
As used in this act:
(1) the term "financial institution'' means any institution subject to
the supervision of the state banking department;
(2) the term "credit reporting agency" shall include any co-operative
credit reporting agency maintained by an association of financial institutions or one or more associations of merchants.
History: L. 1967, ch. 15, § 5 .

CHAPTER 15
FRAUDULENT CHECKS
Sfrtion

7-1 .">-1.
7-15-2.
7-15-3.

Drawing or isMiing ngainst nonexistent account or inswfnVient
— I n t e n t to defraud—Civil liuldity—Damages.
Civil action—Evidence of intent.
Notice of nonpayment or dishonor—When presumed.

funds

7-15-1. Drawing or issuing" against nonexistent account or insufficient
funds—Intent to defraud—Civil liability—Damages.—(1) Any person who
willfully, with intent to defraud makes, draws or issues any cheek, draft
or order upon any bank, banking association or other depositary for the
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any
money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft or order is not honored
upon presentment because the maker, drawer or issuer does not have
the account with the depositary upon which the check, draft or order
has been made or drawn, or does not have sufficient funds in such account
or sufficient credit with such depositary for payment of the check, draft
or order in full, sliall be liable to the holder of the cheek, draft or order in
a civil action as provided in this section.
519

7-15-2

BANKS AND BANKING

(2) Tn such civil action the person making, drawing or issuing the
check, draft or order shall he liable to the holder of it for the amount
thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs
and reasonable attorney's fees.
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, § 1.
Title of Act
An act relating to chocks, d r i f t s or
orders issued against nonexistent account
or in.siiflic-.iont funds; provi.lmg for civil
liability to the holder and for damages in
actions l>ased on this liability; and providing for presumptions regarding willfulness and intent and for notice.
Cross-Reference.
Change of name of state banking department and bank commissioner to departmont of financial institutions and
commissioner of financial institutions, 71-1.1, 7-1-1.2.

CoUateral References.
Overdrafts, 10 Am. J u r . 2d 625, Banks
§ G55.
Postdated chocks, construction and efo f i, |i;i( , ,. n<M . k » statute with respect
j 0 o() ^ j ^ JJ o«l j 181.
Pre-existing debt, construction and eff o c t o f « h a i l O hock'' statute with respect
t o c h e e k i n p . l v m P I l t of, Z9 A. L. K. 2J
Uo!>.
Law Review,
Criminal and Civil Liability for Bad
checks in Ctah, l!>7o T'tah L. Rev. 122.
tV(,t

7-15-2. Civil action—Evidence of intent.—Tn any such civil action any
of the following shall be prima facie evidence that the person making,
drawing or issuing the cheek, draft or order did so willfully with an intention to defraud :
(1) Proof that at the time of issuance, the maker, drawer or issuer
did not have the account with the depositary upon which the cheek, draft
or order was made or drawn or did not have sufficient funds in his
account or credit with the depositary for payment in full of the check,
draft or order, and that he failed within ten days after receiving notice
of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the check, draft or order; or
(2) Proof that when presentment was made within a reasonable time,
the maker, drawer or issuer did not have the account with the depositary
upon which the cheek, draft or order was drawn or made or did not
have sufficient funds in such account or credit with such depositary for
payment in full of the check, draft or order, and that he failed within
ten days after receiving notice of nonpayment or dishonor to pay the
check, draft or order.
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, § 2 .

7-15-3. Notice of nonpayment or dishonor—When presumed.—"Notice"
as used in this act means notice given to the maker, drawer or issuer
of the check, draft or order, either in person or in writing. Such notice
in writing shall be conclusively presumed to have been given when properly
deposited in the United States mails, postage prepaid, by certified or
registered mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to such maker,
drawer or issuer at his address as it appears on the check, draft or order
or at his last-known address.
History: L. 1969, ch. 240, § 3.
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ADDENDUM 2

Liability of Agents on
Corporate Checks:
The Conflicting Coverage of
the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Bad-Check
Remedy Statute
By Eric G. Jorgenson
Eric G. Jorgenson received his J.D. degree from the J. Reuben
Clark Law School at Brigham Young University. He is a member
of the Nevada and Washington State Bars and is currently an
associate with Sitter, Mayer and Mancuso, Ltd. in Las Vegas,
Nevada.

Corporations conduct many business
transactions requiring the use of negotiable instruments. These instruments
must be signed on the corporation's behalf by an authorized agent. In most
transactions involving a corporate
check, the parties intend that only the
corporation be bound by the instrument.
Nevertheless, when a corporate check
is dishonored a question of liability
arises. Who should be held liable — the
corporation, the agent, or both? Two
Utah statutes address this question:
UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-3-403 (1965)
(the Uniform Commercial Code) and
UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1 (1981) (the
Bad-Check Remedy Statute). This article will discuss the operation and effect
of these statutes and reveal the greater
burden of liability placed on corporate
agents1 by the Bad-Check Remedy Statute regardless of the agent's satisfaction of the Uniform Commercial Code

1
Although the scope of this article specifically
deals with the agency relationship in the corporate
setting, Article Three of the Uniform Commercial
Code and the principles set forth in this article are
applicable to any agency relationship.

requirements which free the agent from
personal liability.
I. The Uniform Commercial Code
Article Three of the Uniform Commercial Code establishes a set of rules to
determine the liability of signers of
corporate instruments. The general rule
for liability on a negotiable instrument is
that "[n]o person is liable on an instrument unless his signature appears
thereon."2
The general rule regarding agent
liability on commercial paper is that an
agent is not liable if the principal's name
and the agency relationship appear on
the
instrument.
RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §342(2) on
"Negotiable Instruments" provides:
An agent is not liable as a party to a
negotiable instrument on which the
name of the principal appears as if it
is interpreted as being executed by
the agent only on behalf of such principal and if the agent has power to
bind the principal.

2

UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-3-401(1) (1965).

64

This rule was adopted by UTAH CODE
ANN. §70A-3-403 (1965)3 (hereinafter
"70A-3-403"). Thus, on a dishonored
corporate check the corporation is liable
while the authorized agent avoids personal liability provided the following
70A-3-403 requirements are met: (1) the
agent names the corporation on the instrument and (2) the agent demonstrates his agency relationship. The remainder of the discussion of 70A-3-403'
will deal with the personal liability of
corporate agents.
The corporate agent who signs a
corporate check without naming the corporation or disclosing his agency relationship will be personally liable on the
instrument and is precluded from introducing parol evidence to deny liability.
70A-3-403(2)(a) provides:
An authorized representative who
signs his own name to an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names the person
represented nor shows that the representative signed in a representative
capacity.
3

UTAH CODE ANN. §70A-3-403 (1965) provides:
(1) A signature may be made by an agent or
other representative, and his authority to make it
may be established as in other cases of representation. No particular form of appointment is
necessary to establish such authority.
(2) An authorized representative who signs his
own name to an instrument
(a) is personally obligated if the instrument
neither names the person represented nor shows
that the representative signed in a representative
capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between
the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the
instrument names the person represented but
does not show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity, or if the instrument does
not name the person represented but does show
that the representative signed in a representative
capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of
an organization preceded or followed by the name
and office of an authorized individual is a signature
made in a representative capacity.
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In the Utah case of Sterling Press v.
Pettit,4 a printing firm sued two corporate officers of a magazine publishing
business.*The plaintiff received a check
for services rendered to the business
drawn on the corporate account and
signed by the defendants. The defendants failed to designate their agency
relationship on the check. The check
was dishonored and returned to the
" plaintiff marked return to maker. The defendants argued that they should not be
personally liable because the plaintiff
should have know he was dealing with a
corporation. This argument was based
on two grounds: first, the initial checks in
payment for the printing were drawn on
a corporate account; and second, further investigation by the plaintiff into mailing permits and bank accounts would
have shown that a corporation stood behind the magazine. The Utah Supreme
Court rejected these arguments and
stated that 4,70A-3-403 requires that an
agent or representative must show he
actually is representing someone.
Where the instrument neither names the
entity represented nor shows the representative capacity, the person who
signed is personally obligated."5
U.C.C. §3-403 problems most frequently involve instruments which name
the corporate entity but fail to disclose
the agency relationship. 6 70A-3403(2)(b), which applies to this situation,
provides:
(2) An authorized representative
who signs his own name to an instrument. . .

4

580 P.2d 599 (Utah 1978).
Id. at 600.
Holland, Corporate Officers Beware — Your
Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May Be
Hazardous to Your Economic Health, 13 IND. L.
REV. 893, 904 (1980).
5

6
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(b) except as otherwise established
between the immediate parties, is
personally obligated if the instrument
names the person represented but
does not show that the representative
signed in a representative capacity,
or if the instrument does not name
the person represented but does
show that the representative signed
in a representative capacity.
The characterization of the holder of the
instrument is critical to the determination
of the agent's liability. If the holder is an
immediate party to the instrument (the
payee of the check), the agent and the
corporation may introduce parol evidence to demonstrate that the agent
was not intended to be held liable. If the
holder of the instrument is a third party
transferee, parol evidence is not permitted and the agent will be personally liable on the instrument.
In Highfield v. Lang,7 the plaintiff, an
employee of Orbit Postal Systems,
brought action against Orbit's vicepresident who had signed the plaintiff's
dishonored payroll check. The corporate
name appeared on the check but the
defendant failed to designate her representative capacity. Since the plaintiff
was the payee of the check, the court
allowed the defendant to produce parol
evidence indicating that the plaintiff
knew he was being paid by the corporation and the defendant was acting-merely as an agent. Consequently, the court
held that the defendant was not personally liable.
When the corporate name is printed
on the check but the signature on the
instrument does not specifically include
the corporate name or show the agency
relationship, there is some dispute as to
7

394 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. App. 1979).
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whether U.C.C. §3-403(2)(a) or U.C.C.
§3-403(2)(b) applies. In American Exchange Bank v. Cessna* the Oklahoma
Federal District Court applied U.C.C. §3403(2)(b). The defendant signed the
corporate check without indicating his
representative capacity, but the name of
the corporation appeared in the lefthand corner along with a corporate
address and telephone number. Since
the plaintiff was a third party transferee,
the defendant was not allowed to introduce parol evidence to show his agency
relationship. Thus, the court held for the
plaintiff.9 In a case with a similar fact
pattern,10 the Georgia Supreme Court
applied U.C.C. §3-403(2)(a) and found
the corporate agent liable.11
70A-3-403(2)(b) also applies to the
situation where the agent clearly demonstrates his agency relationship but
fails to name the corporation.12 Thus,
the agent will be precluded from using
parol evidence and will be personally
obligated to pay the dishonored corporate check if the holder of the check is a
third party transferee. The agent may

8

386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okl. 1974).
See also, Poilin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 211 Pa.
Super. 87, 236 A.2d 542 (1967). The court held
that defendant's signature was in a representative
capacity where no capacity was specifically designated, but the check was designated a payroll
check and the corporation's name appeared at top
and in maker's position, above lines for manual
signature.
10
Southern Oxygen Supply Co. v. Golian, 230
Ga. 405, 197 S.E. 2d 374 (1973).
11
See also, Griffin v. Eilmger, 538 S.W.2d 97
(Tex. 1976).
12
See Holland, Corporate Officers Beware —
Your Signature on a Negotiable Instrument May be
Hazardous to Your Economic Health, 13 IND. L
REV. 893, 904 n. 55 (1980), where Mr. Holland
states that "[rjesearch has revealed two cases
which the representative capacity but not the
corporate identity was shown." The two cases are:
Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977) and National Bank of Georgia v.
Ament, 127 Ga. App. 838, 195 S.E.2d 202 (1973).
9
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introduce parol evidence only if the holder is the payee of the check.
Where the name of the corporation is
preceded or followed by the authorized
signature which shows the agency relationship, the corporation is usually the
only entity bound by the instrument.
70A-3-403(3) provides:
Except as otherwise established the
name of an organization preceded or
followed by the name and office of an
authorized individual is a signature
made in a representative capacity.
The exception under 70A-3-403(3) to
the general rule of corporate liability
allows the holder of a dishonored instrument to use parol evidence to establish
the agent's personal liability by demonstrating that the intent of the parties was
to bind both the agent and the
corporation. 1 3 Nevertheless, courts
generally have denied the use of parol
evidence
if the instrument
is
unambiguous.14
In summary, under the Uniform Commercial Code, an authorized agent who
signs a corporate check will not be
personally liable if he (1) names his principal and (2) demonstrates his agency
relationship. If the signer completes only
one of the requirements, he will be personally liable unless the holder of the
instrument is the original payee and the
signer can produce parol evidence
which shows that the intent of the parties was to bind only the corporation.
Thus, 70A-3-403 gives the corporate
agent the mechanism to insulate himself
from personal liability on a dishonored
negotiable instrument.

13
See, e.g., Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman, 222
Pa. Super. 400, 296 A.2d 275 (1972).
14
See Phoenix Air Conditioning Co. v. Pound,
123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (1971).
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II. The Bad-Check Remedy Statute
and its Impact on the
Uniform Commercial Code
The original bad check law contained
in UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15 (1953) presumed an intent to defraud when a
check was dishonored. The presumption
of fraud could be overcome by showing
that the check was intended to clear. In
1979 the section was amended.15 The
new section removed the issue of fraud
and placed absolute liability on the
issuer of a dishonored check as well as
the signing agent. The 1981 amendment16 of UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1
(1981)17 (hereinafter "7-15-1") is very
similar to the 1979 version. 7-15-1(1)
provides:
Any person who makes, draws, signs
or issues any check, draft, order, or
other instrument upon any depository
institution, whether as corporate
agent or otherwise, for the purpose of
obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any money,
merchandise, property or other thing
of value or paying for any service,

15

1979 Utah Laws ch. 92 §1.
1981 Utah Laws ch. 16 §1.
UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1 (1981) provides:
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs or
issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument
upon any depository institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation any money, merchandise, property or other
thing of value or paying for any service, wages,
salary or rent, which check, draft, order, or other
instrument is not honored upon presentment and
is marked "refer to maker" or the account with the
depository upon which the check, draft, order, or
other instrument has been made or drawn, does
not exist, has been closed or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit with such depository
for payment of the check, draft, or other instrument
in full, shall be liable to the holder thereof.
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other
instrument which has been dishonored may give
16
17
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wages, salary or rent, which check,
draft, order, or other instrument is not
honored upon presentment and is
marked "refer to maker" or the
account with the depository upon
which the check, draft, order, or other
instrument has been made or drawn,
does not exist, has been closed or
does not have sufficient funds or
sufficient credit with such depository
for payment of the check, draft, or
other instrument in full, shall be liable
to the holder thereof. (Emphasis
added).
The purpose of 7-15-1 is to protect
the holder of a dishonored check. It imposes personal liability on any person
who signs a dishonored check, including
the authorized agent who properly signs
a corporate check by naming the corporation represented and disclosing the
agency relationship. In the case of a
corporate check, the holder may seek
recovery from both the corporation and
the agent who signed the instrument.
Prior to filing an action to collect on an
instrument, the holder is required to give
"written notice of intent to file civil acwritten or verbal notice thereof to the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft,
order, or other instrument and may imoose a service charge not to exceed $5 in addition to any
contractual agreement between the parties. Prior
to filing an action based upon this section, the
holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or other
instrument shall give the person making, drawing,
signing, or issuing the dishonored check, draft,
order, or other instrument written notice of intent to
file civil action, allowing the person seven days
from the date on which the notice was mailed to
tender payment in full, plus a service charge is
imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, or
other instrument.
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing,
signing or issuing the check, draft order, or other
instrument shall be liable to the holder of it for the
amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
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tion, allowing the person seven days...
to tender payment in full."18 This gives
the drawer the opportunity to pay the
dishonored check before costly litigation
is commenced.
The scope and purposes of 70A-3403 (Uniform Commercial Code) and 715-1 (Bad-Check Remedy Statute) are
distinct; 70A-3-403, when properly followed, insulates the authorized agent
from personal liability on a dishonored
corporate instrument, while 7-15-1 protects the holder of a dishonored check.
Yet, the two statutes overlap because
7-15-1 imposes absolute personal liability on any person who signs a dishonored check, including the corporate
agent who complies with the 70A-3-403
non-liability requirements of naming the
principal and demonstrating the agency
relationship.
The burden of collecting a dishonored
corporate check is shifted by 7-15-1
from the holder to the signing agent.
The agent is not a party to the business
transaction; his role is to sign the corporate check because the corporation is
unable to do so. Thus, the agent receives no direct personal benefit from
the transaction. On the other hand, the
holder receives a benefit from the business transaction. For example, the holder may be a businessman who extends
credit to the corporation for goods sold,
a craftsman who performs services for
pay, or an employee. The holder who is
not an original payee bargains with the
payee in an arms length transaction
when he accepts the check.19 Since the
agent is not a party to the business
18

UTAH CODE ANN. §7-15-1(2) (1981).
Also, 70A-3-403 provides more protection to
the hoider who is a third party transferee than the
holder who is an original payee. An agent may use
19
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transaction and does not receive any
direct benefit from the transaction it is
inequitable to force the agent to collect
the bad check for the holder.
It may be argued that an agent who
signs a corporate check is or should be
aware of the status of the corporate
account when the check is drawn. But
courts have refused to impute knowledge of the status of the corporate
account to an agent simply because of
the agent's position as a corporate
officer.20 Even if this knowledge is imputed to the corporate officer, it is debatable whether the same standard of
knowledge should be imposed on a
salaried clerk, secretary, or other agent
who has no control over the corporate
account or knowledge of its status.
III.

Conclusion

Although 7-15-1 zealously protects
holders of dishonored negotiable instru-

paro! evidence to avoid personal liability on a dishonored negotiable instrument only if (1) he complies with at least one of the non-liability requirements (name the corporation and show the agency
relationship) and (2) the holder is the original
payee. Thus, an agent will be personally liable on
a dishonored negotiable instrument to a third party
transferee unless the agent complies completely
with 70A-3-403.
^Highfield v. Lang, 394 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. App.
1979).

ments, it is too broad in its scope because it encroaches upon established
principles of commercial and agency
law. The burden of collecting a dishonored check is shifted by 7-15-1 from the
holder who is a party to the business
transaction and receives the benefit of
the transaction to the corporate agent
who may have little or no control over
corporate affairs and receives no personal benefit from the transaction.
The rights of all parties could be more
equitably protected if 7-15-1 incorporated the principles of agency liability as
set out in 70A-3-403. The statutes could
be harmonized by changing 7-15-1 to
require a rebuttable presumption of
fraud in lieu of imposing absolute liability
on the authorized agent who signs a
negotiable instrument on behalf of the
principal. This will protect the authorized
agent who, in the course of his or her
duties, is required to sign a negotiable
instrument which is subsequently dishonored. The holder will still receive
adequate protection because he can
look to the corporation and the agent if
the agent does not rebut the presumption of fraud or fails to comply with the
70A-3-403 non-liability requirements set
out in subsection I of this article. This
alternative will equitably balance the interests of the agent and holder.

Grant us grace fearlessly to contend against evil and to make no peace
with oppression; and, that we may reverently use our freedom, help us to
employ it in the maintenance of justice among men and nations.
— Book of Common Prayer
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ROBERT H. WILDEf USB # 3466
Attorney for Plaintiff
COOK & WILDEf P.C.
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, Utah 84047
Telephone: (801) 255-6000
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHNNY HAIGr
ORDER OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

3Z/t>

ORRICE McSHANE,
Defendant,
ORRICE McSHANE,
Third Party Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. C85-8070

RONALD DAVEY,

Judge Scott Daniels

Third Party Defendant.
This matter came on regularly before the Court on the
21st day of March, 1986 at the hour of 2:00 p.m., the
Honorable Scott Daniels presiding.

Plaintiff was

represented by Robert H. Wilde; Defendant was represented
by J. Ray Barrios.

The parties had previously submitted

memoranda on the issues raised in the Motion before the
Court which memoranda had been reviewed by the Court.
Court heard argument from counsel, and, being fully
-1-

The

advised in the premises, ruled that the statute in
consideration, Utah Code Annotated §7-15-1 (1953, as
amended) is a strict liability statute, and that even if
the Defendant, or another party, had advised the Plaintiff
that there were not sufficient funds to allow the check to
clear at the time the check was provided to the Plaintiff,
the provisions of the statute establish the liability of
the Defendant.

Court being fully advised in the premises

and good cause appearing therefore,
NOW THEREFORE it is hereby ordered that the Plaintiff
is awarded summary judgment against the Defendant in the
principal amount of $10,563.49, with interest thereon of
$3,433.13, and attorney's fees of $770.00.
DATED this

^

day of

Af)

* I

1986.

BY THE COURT:

£jCtu$
JUDGE SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
MAILED, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing
Order for Summary Judgment to J. Ray Barrios, Attorney for
Defendant, 136 East South Temple, Suite 900, University
Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this JPUf* day
of y V h n c h

f 1986.

rrML0on^fcfo+i77<yrfI>
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ADDENDUM

7-14-4
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FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

or credit reporting agency the following: (1) that an account maintained
to effect third party payment transactions has been closed out by the institution, the reasons therefor, and the identity of the depositor or account
holder; (2) upon the request of another financial institution any other
information in the files of the institution relating to the credit experience
of the reporting institution with respect to a particular person as to whom
inquiry is made; and (3) any information concerning attempted or potential
activity to defraud a financial institution or to obtain funds from a financial institution by fraudulent or other unlawful means or other information relating to individuals sought by law enforcement authorities for
alleged violations of criminal laws.
History: C. 1953, 7-14-3, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 12.

7-14-4. Immunity from liability. No depository institution making any
report or communication of information authorized by this chapter shall
be liable to any person for disclosing such information to any recipient
authorized to receive this information under this chapter, or for any error
or omission in such report or communication.
History: C. 1953, 7-14-4, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 12.

7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information authorized. One or more
financial institutions may jointly agree with one or more other financial
institutions for the reciprocal exchange of any information authorized to
be reported by the provisions of this chapter. Such reciprocal exchange of
information or the acts or refusals to act of one or more recipients because
of such information shall not constitute a boycott or blacklist, or otherwise
be a basis for liability to any person on the part of any participant in the
reciprocal exchange of information authorized by this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 7-14-5, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 12.

CHAPTER 15
FRAUDULENT CHECKS
Section
7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer — Notice.
7-15-2. Notice form.

7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer — Notice. (1) Any person who makes,
draws, signs or issues any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon
any depository institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for
the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership or corporation
any money, merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for
224
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7-15-2

any service, wages, salary or rent, which check, draft, order, or other
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked "refer to
maker" or the account with the depository upon which the check, draft,
order, or other instrument has been made or drawn, does not exist, has
been closed or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit with such
depository for payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in full,
shall be liable to the holder thereof.
(2) The holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrument which has
been dishonored may give written or verbal notice thereof to the person
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other
instrument and may impose a service charge not to exceed $5 in addition
to any contractual agreement between the parties. Prior to filing an action
based upon this section, the holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or
other instrument shall give the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing
the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument written notice of
intent to file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date on
which the notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus a service
charge is imposed for the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument.
(3) In a civil action the person making, drawing, signing or issuing the
check, draft, order, or other instrument shall be liable to the holder of it
for the amount thereon, for interest and all costs of collection, including
all court costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
History: C. 1953, 7-15-1, enacted by L. Collateral References.
1981, ch. 16, § 13.
1 0 C J S B i U s a n d N o t e s § § 35^ m
Compiler's Notes.
12 AmJur 2d 147, Bills and Notes § 1119.
Laws 1981, ch. 16, §1 repealed old sections
Necessity of pleading that maker or
7-15-1. 7-15-3 (L. 1969, ch. 240, §§ 1, 3; 1977, drawer of check was given notice of its disch. 15, §§ 1, 3; 1979, ch. 92, §§ 1, 2), relating to honor by bank, 6 ALR 2d 985.
fraudulent checks. New sections 7-15-1 and
Personal liability of officers or directors of
7-1D-2 were enacted by §13 of the act. c o r p o r a t i o n o n cor porate checks issued
Ctl
l 0 2 WaS r e p e a k d b y U W S
Fn°.rome
[ Sno
against insufficient funds, 47 ALR 3d 1250.
1979,
en.
92, *°?
9 3. " "
Cross-References.
Criminal penalties for issuing bad check,
76-6-505.

Law

Reviews.
Criminal and Civil Liability for Bad
Checks in Utah, 1970 Utah L. Rev. 122..

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Fraud.
account, plaintiff accepted it with knowledge
There was no fraudulent issuance of a that there were insufficient funds to cover it
check, and plaintiff was not entitled to attor- and agreed to hold it for two weeks before
ney fees in an action on the check, where the presenting it to the bank. Howells, Inc. v.
check was issued to pay on a past due Nelson (1977) 565 P 2d 1147.

7-15-2. Notice form. (1) "Notice" means notice given to the person
making, drawing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other instrument
either in person or in writing. Such notice, in writing, shall be conclusively
presumed to have been given when properly deposited in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered mail, return receipt
225
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requested, and addressed to such signer at his address as it appears on
the-check, draft, order, or other instrument or at his last-known address.
(2) Written notice as applied in subsection 7-15-1 (2) shall take the following form:
Date:
To:
You are hereby notified that check(s) described below
issued by you has been returned to us unpaid:
Instrument date:
Instrument number
Originating institution:
Amount
Reason for dishonor (marked on instrument):
The foregoing instrument together with a service charge of $5 must be
paid to the undersigned within seven days from the date of this notice in
accordance with section 7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, or appropriate
civil legal action may be filed against you for the amount due and owing
together with service charges, interest, court costs, and attorney's fees as
provided by law.
In addition, the criminal code provides in section 76-6-505, Utah Code
Annotated 1953: Any person who issues or passes a check for the payment
of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership,
or corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for
any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by
the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a
bad check. The foregoing civil action does not preclude the right to prosecute under the criminal code of the State of Utah.
(Signed)
Name of Holder:
Address of Holder:_
Telephone Number.
History: C. 1953, 7-15-2, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 16, § 13.
Separability Clause.
Section 14 of Laws 1981, ch. 16 provided:
"If any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any person or cir-

cumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of
this act shall not be affected thereby."
Effective Date.
Section 16 of
of Laws 1981, ch. 16 provided:
"This act shall take effect on July 1,1981

CHAPTER 16
CONSUMER FUNDS TRANSFER FACILITIES ACT
Section
7-16-1.
7-16-2.
7-16-3.
7-16-4.

Legislative findings and purpose of act — Short title.
Definitions.
Application of act — Restrictions on use of facilities.
Consumer funds transfer facilities board created — Members — Appointment —
Terms — Vacancies — Disclosure statement — Per diem allowance and travel
expenses — Executive secretary — Staff.
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